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DESTABILISATION OF POLITICAL SPACE  
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ABSTRACT The article deals with recent developments in terms of elite 
configuration and its impact on political stability in post-communist countries from 
East-Central Europe, especially with regard to the structure of political/party space. 
The author observes that none of the countries from this region has a political space 
that matches those of established democracies, where the key role is played by two 
parties, one on the left and another on the right of the political center. The claim 
is made that these developments are strongly related to an increase in polarization 
within the political elite, and the corresponding decline in elite consensus, resulting 
in the weakening of the potential for cooperation between elite factions. It is argued 
that this decline is only partially conditioned by global crisis, but is more significantly 
correlated to the specific nature of the transformation process. 
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INTRODUCTION
The success (or failure) of the societal transformation of post-communist 
societies strongly depends on their ability to create conditions for the social 
self-organization and participation of different autonomous actors in the policy-
making process. The formal installation of institutions of a parliamentary 
democracy, based on political competition and government that enjoys 
majoritarian support of the citizenry, is a necessary but not a sufficient condition 
for the successful completion of the democratic transition (Tomšič 2016). In this 
regard, the key role is played by the political elite who can be defined, according 
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to Higley and Burton (2006:7), as “persons who are able, by the virtue of their 
strategic positions in powerful organisations and movements, to affect political 
outcomes regularly and substantially.” It can be perceived that the main agents 
of systemic change in the course of development of these societies, as well as 
the extent and tempo of such change, strongly depend on their way of conduct. 
However, their impact varies substantially, since it depends on socio-historical 
circumstances; i.e., “it is enlarged or constrained by the elites from other realms 
(e.g. from the economy), by their voters and the entire population, and finally by 
the institutional, political, economic and cultural context elites are embedded 
in” (Vogel and Rodriguez-Teruel 2016: 9). 
The course of the development of former communist countries in the East 
Central Europe thus depends strongly on the character of the national political 
elite, since this plays a crucial role in the process of forming the institutional 
framework that determines the activities of actors in different social spheres. 
The configuration of the elite (i.e., the relationships between different elite 
factions, as well as their prevalent value patterns) influences the nature of 
political regimes, as well as the mode of regulating relations in economic and 
other social fields in a particular country (Adam et al. 2009; Tomšič 2016). 
This article deals with recent developments in terms of elite configuration 
and its impact on political stability in post-communist countries from East-
Central Europe (focusing on countries from the region that became members 
of the EU in 2004), especially with regard to the structure of political/party 
space. It thematizes the level of consensus between different factions of the 
political elite which is, according to democratic elite theory, a precondition for 
the stabilization of democracy. We observe that, at the moment, none of the 
countries from the region has a political space that matches those of established 
democracies, where the key role is continuously played by two major parties, 
one on the left and another on the right of the political center. Even the countries 
where this used to be the case – like the Czech Republic and Slovenia – have 
experienced destabilization of the political space and deconsolidation of political 
parties in recent years. Stability of party structure and the ability to maintain 
a consensual type of political elite are significantly interconnected. Consensus 
can be achieved only when inter-party relations are transparent; i.e., when a 
rather limited set of political competitors is able to elaborate and pursue their 
policy orientations – provided they share basic norms and values. We claim 
that the above-mentioned developments are strongly correlated to an increase 
in polarization within the political elite, and a corresponding decline in elite 
consensus, resulting in a weakening of the potential for cooperation between 
elite factions. This decline is only partially and indirectly conditioned by the 
global crisis. It is more significantly related to the specifics of the transformation 
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process and relations within the political elite. These developments, and the 
corresponding stagnation and in some cases even backsliding in terms of the 
quality of democracy, question the strength of the initial consensus within 
national elites.
ELITES AS AGENTS OF DEMOCRATIC 
DEVELOPMENT
Social theories dealing with the phenomenon of elites in contemporary 
societies differ from each other, especially in regard to their conception of power 
structures and power relations. Some of them – for example, theories of ruling 
classes, (Neo-)Marxist theories, and theories of ruling elites – claim that, in 
Western societies, power is strongly concentrated in individual centers of power 
which are closely interconnected and whose interests are identical (Hoffmann-
Lange 1992: 98). In his famous study on the ‘power elite’, C. Wright Mills (1956) 
stated that American society is dominated by a ruling class as a cohesive group 
composed of key people from political, business and military circles. On the 
other hand, adherents of pluralist theory claim that in contemporary democratic 
societies power is relatively dispersed, meaning there exists a situation whereby 
no group, no matter how well equipped with different strategic resources, is in a 
position to exert social hegemony. In this way, one cannot speak about the elite 
as a ruling class but about different elite factions that pursue different interests 
and thus often oppose each other. Robert Dahl (1956, 1989) declares modern 
democracy to be a ‘polyarchy’; a phenomenon created by the dispersed rule 
of heterogeneous social powers, based on participation of the citizenry (that 
refers both to the right of people to select power holders, and to the possibility 
to participate with their proposals in the decision-making process), the equality 
of individual votes, and respect for and exertion of the legitimate will of the 
majority. A relative deconcentration of power (in comparison to other political 
regimes) is also manifest in the ability of different social and political groups 
(including protest ones) to integrate into the political process (Etzioni-Halevy 
1990: 210).
Those theorists who see social and political power as concentrated perceive the 
role of elites as problematic from a democratic perspective since – they argue – it 
curtails the participation of ordinary citizens in the political process and hinders 
their exercise of control over power-holders, while other approaches claim that 
the existence of elites is not incompatible with democratic principles. From the 
so-called elite-pluralist (or elite-democratic) perspective, elites (particularly the 
ruling elite) are the key players in society in terms of their exertion of power and 
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ability to make decisions about the most relevant matters; however, they do not 
represent a unified conglomerate of power, but a set of relatively autonomous 
groups. The structure of modern elites is, as already acknowledged by Weber 
(1978), complex and diverse. Further, their range of action is considerably limited 
through mechanisms that enable non-elites to exercise certain forms of control 
over the elite’s conduct. In this regard, elites are perceived not as inhibitors of 
democracy, but as agents of its stability and development. As stated by Best and 
Higley (2010: 9): “Democratic elitism portrays elites as democracy’s guardians, 
without whose protection democracy would probably unravel”. Elite settlement 
in terms of compliance by different elite factions is the key condition for the 
consolidation of democratic systems and the stable functioning of political life 
in accordance with democratic norms and principles. 
In order for elites to perform their democratic function, certain conditions 
have to be fulfilled. We speak here about elite autonomy, pluralism and 
professionalism. The very autonomy of elites is meant to be one of the 
characteristics of democratic order (Etzioni-Halevy 1993) where every faction 
of the political elite follows its own agenda, pursues interests of its own 
constituency, and carries out its activities on the basis of its own resources. 
The existence of elite pluralism means that power-positions are not ‘reserved’ 
for some of its factions. Schumpeter (1976: 269) defines democracy as “an 
institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals 
acquire power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s 
vote”. According to Sartori (1987: 151), the essence of democracy as a type of 
political rule lies in the principle of competition for power-positions, since “no 
matter how oligarchic the organisation of each minority turns out to be when 
examined from within, the result of the competition between them is, in the 
aggregate, democracy”. What matters is not the equal possession of power but – 
at least in principle – equal access to it; i.e., the equal opportunity of individuals 
to occupy power (i.e. elite) positions. 
ELITE CONFIGURATION AND POLITICAL DYNAMICS
Relations between elite factions strongly determine the character of the 
political setting. This applies also to democratic systems. The character of a 
political system in fact depends largely on the type of relations among the various 
political elites (Field et al. 1990; Higley and Burton 1998). This is particularly 
true in the case of a system transformation in which elites play the role of 
institution-builders (Kaminski and Kurczewska 1994). As stated above, elite 
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settlement that creates consensus over fundamental rules and principles is one 
of the key prerequisites for the stable functioning of representative democracy. 
Without at least basic agreement among elites on the key strategic goals of 
society, consistent policy-making processes can hardly take place. Co-operation 
between various ideologically opposing political (and not just political) elites is 
required to maintain the stability of democratic societies, since their integration 
in the sense of mutual communication and co-operation regarding strategic 
decisions enables the shaping of a consensus concerning fundamental social 
principles.
On the basis of the integration and differentiation of elites, Higley et al. 
(1998: 3-5) distinguish between four different types of elites: a consensual 
elite (characteristically with a high level of integration and a high level of 
differentiation), an ideocratic elite (a high level of integration and a low level of 
differentiation), a fragmented elite (a low level of integration and a high level of 
differentiation ), and a divided elite (a low level of integration and a low level of 
differentiation). The configuration of elites is connected to the dynamic of the 
replacements that are made within it, namely with the method of recruitment to 
elite positions and the relationships between the different factions of the elite. 
Higley and co-workers define four patterns of replacements or circulation of elites 
which differ with respect to their extensiveness (the number of positions subject 
to replacement, and the thoroughness of the replacements and the mode (speed 
and non-violence/violence) of replacements): classic circulation with extensive 
and thorough but peaceful and gradual changes; reproduction circulation – 
peaceful and gradual yet small and shallow changes; replacement circulation – 
thorough, extensive, fast and violent changes; and quasi-replacement circulation 
– fast and violent but small and shallow changes (Higley and Pakulski 1999; 
Higley and Lengyel 2000). 
Classic circulation can lead to the shaping of the consensual type of the 
elite and thus to the consolidation of democracy, while the other patterns of 
replacement lead to configurations of elites that do not constitute the basis for 
successful democratic development (reproduction suits a fragmented elite and 
weak or unconsolidated democracy, replacement suits an ideocratic elite and 
totalitarian or post-totalitarian regime, and quasi-replacement suits a divided 
elite and an authoritarian regime). 
For a coherent and effective policy-making process to take place, consensus 
in terms of agreement within the political elite regarding the main societal goals 
and policy orientations is necessary. This applies also to other ‘strategic’ elites 
(business, intellectual, religious, etc.) whose role is to maintain the successful 
functioning of different fields of society (see Keller 1991). Strategic goals can be 
successfully attained only with the full cooperation of all elite segments. 
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While emphasizing the consensus of the elite as a condition of democratic 
stability, it must be added that both consensus and quasi-solidarity between 
political elites can also lead to clientism and a lack of responsibility for 
national development. Examples of this can be found not only in ‘new’ but 
also in developed Western democracies. Thus a balance between consensus 
and competition, and between the reproduction of the elites (which ensures a 
certain level of stability and foresight) and their circulation (which represents 
the factor of change and innovation and also a factor of political control), is 
essential for a successful democracy. “Rotation (and competition) between 
two or more factions of political elite as well as in the sense of inflow of new 
actors into other elite segments, is the structural condition sine qua non for 
the constitution of a polyarchic type of democracy and sustained socio-
economic development” (Adam and Tomšič 2002: 448-49). In this light, the 
relationship between consensus, conflict and competition should be redefined 
and a more precise typology should be formulated. As claimed by Diamond 
(1990), contemporary democracy is a complex system that rests on different and 
sometimes contradictory principles. Thus the ability to build consensus has to 
be counterbalanced by the mutual control of different elite factions who must 
be capable of offering political alternatives that provide a meaningful choice to 
voters. 
ELITES AND DEMOCRATISATION IN FORMER 
COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
When dealing with the role of the political elite in the transition process, 
one has to determine the key characteristics of the social groups that represent 
(actually or potentially) the leading force in society. Namely, the nature of 
political elites differs in several ways that include: the mode of recruitment of 
their members; their relationship toward non-elites; the type of relations within 
the elite (the level of formalization and inclusion); types of power struggle 
(aggressiveness or non-violence, intransigence or willingness for dialogue); and 
prevalent ideological orientations. Further, the nature of any political elite is 
importantly characterized by its perception of the legitimacy of the authority 
that determines its mode of political conduct.
Political elites that were formed after the collapse of communist regimes 
were made up of individuals and groups with varying social and historical 
origins and ideological orientations: former dissidents of diverse origins, 
more or less reformist members of the ex-communist nomenclature, members 
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of professional groups (so-called technocrats), people from the sphere of the 
Church, and even some members of pre-war political elites. According to some 
analysts, transitional political elites display several common traits – particularly, 
exclusivity towards the non-elite and a lack of professionalism. Consequently, 
societies at large regard them as unified players that monopolize politics and 
exercise control over the whole of social life (Agh 1996:45). However, instances 
of opposition and conflict between various factions of the elite are common; 
above all, there is competition for the control of key resources by forging 
different social connections (e.g. the search for alliances, and the creation of 
various ‘coalitions’). This fact indicates that the political elite does not represent 
a unified group.
The configuration of national elites, meaning the relative position and size of 
various elite circles in the constellation of power, differs considerably from one 
post-socialist country to another, and the same is true for the balance between 
the reproduction and circulation of elites (Dogan 2003; Bozoki 2003, Lengyel 
et al. 2007) It is precisely the balance and relations among the recently emerged 
factions of the post-socialist elite that decisively determine the character of 
political regimes (primarily in terms of the division of power in society; i.e., the 
level of its dispersal or concentration, as well as social order as a whole).
According to the perspective of democratic elitism, elite settlement in the form 
of agreement between key elite factions, especially between the reformed part 
of the communist elite and the newly-formed opposition, was the main condition 
for the stabilization of democracy in former communist countries from East-
Central Europe. Examples of such development include the ‘round tables’ in 
Hungary and Poland in 1989 which resulted in an agreement to carry out free 
and open multi-party elections in 1990. A similarly gradual and co-operative 
democratic transition also characterized some other countries such as the Baltic 
States and Slovenia.
Adherents of the democratic elitism approach who have studied democratic 
transformation in this region detect a division between East Central Europe, 
on the one hand, and Eastern and South Eastern Europe on the other with 
regard to the configuration of the political elite (Higley et al. 1998; Higley and 
Pakulski 1999). In the former, the consensual type became prevalent, while 
the latter became dominated by fragmentation and division. Differences in 
elite configuration had a significant impact on the functioning of democracy. 
Countries from East Central Europe managed to establish consolidated 
democracies and a stabilized political space. On the other hand, democracy 
remained unconsolidated in Eastern and South Eastern European countries, 
with a high level of political instability, and some even experienced the return 
of authoritarianism.
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CHARACTERISTICS OF POST-COMMUNIST 
POLITICAL SYSTEMS
The main aim of countries that underwent post-communist transformation was 
to carry out political, economic, social and cultural modernization and thus to 
overcome their status at the European (semi) periphery which has characterized 
such societies for centuries (Janos 2000). This refers also to the establishment 
of a democratic system of governance. In this regard, some of those countries – 
new members of the EU from East-Central Europe – managed to establish the 
key institutional mechanisms necessary for successful democratic life (see, for 
example, Adam et al. 2005). 
In formal terms, the party systems of former communist countries resemble 
those of the West. The parties also largely adopted the basic organizational 
principles and styles that their counterparts in established democracies have 
in place (van Biezen 2003). Many of them are members of European party 
associations. 
However, the social basis that determines their structuration is different in 
some important aspects that are related to the specifics of the modernization 
process. As stated by Evans and Whitefield (1993: 522), “communism deprived 
individuals of institutional or social structured identities from which to drive 
political interests, other than those of the nation or mass society”. Political 
space in most of these countries is still characterized by relative instability and 
volatility. This is mostly the consequence of the weak profiles and identities of 
many political parties that have considerably hindered them in establishing a 
stable electoral base (Baylis 1998). This is reflected in weak linkages between 
party elites and their constituencies (Lewis 2001). Political parties in post-
communist countries, when compared to their counterparts in established 
democracies of Western Europe, lack mass memberships – certain exceptions 
include some post-Communist or former satellite parties (Cabada 2013:81). 
The ideological focus or self-identification of many political parties in East 
Central Europe is often very shallow and formal, their programs are often 
very vague and incomprehensive, and such parties are keen to switch their 
policy orientations if they expect political benefits from such conduct. Some 
of them have undergone a significant transition in terms of ideological profile.2 
Ideological ‘emptiness’ particularly holds true for ‘niche parties’. Parties of 
2  One obvious example is the current ruling Hungarian party Fidesz, which evolved from a liberal-
centrist-oriented party to a strongly conservative and nationalistic one. Some of its orientations 
have changed completely; for example, attitudes toward Russia: once it was fiercely anti-Russian, 
now it is pro-Russian. Interestingly, this happened under the same leader – Victor Orban – testifying 
to the ‘flexibility’ of his personal affiliations. 
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this type that reject the traditional class-based orientation of politics and which 
transcend socio-economic cleavage, and that are also – unlike traditional ‘catch-
all’ parties – focused on a narrow set of non-economic issues (Meguid 2005; 
Adams et al. 2006; Wagner 2012) are even more numerous in this region than 
in Western Europe. In this regard, they differ from their Western counterparts 
which are often very coherent and focused in terms of ideological orientations 
(the Italian Five Star Movement is one exception). Unlike the former, they build 
their public appeal on the general criticism of established political parties and 
the ‘character’ of their leaders. The irony is that such parties often transform 
themselves into mainstream ones (examples include Smer in Slovakia, ANO 
2011 in the Czech Republic, and Positive Slovenia in Slovenia). 
Political actors in general and political parties in particular are often criticized 
for their desire to take control of various social systems, mostly those that could 
contribute to the conservation or obtaining of positions of power. For example, 
Attila Agh (1996: 55) speaks about “overparticisation”, which refers to the 
aspirations of political parties to exclude other actors from political life.  This 
“partitocracy” is not so much an expression of the parties’ strength, but of their 
weakness; i.e., their weak intellectual and organizational potential (which they 
try to ‘compensate’ for by ‘borrowing’ resources from other areas) (Cabada 
and Tomšič 2016). In any case, such practices strongly contribute to the low 
confidence and bad image of such political parties in the eyes of the public, 
regardless of their ideological orientation. 
Weak links between parties and society, coupled with a lack of democratic 
experience, as well as with the unresponsive and irresponsible conduct of 
political elites, results in the high level of public distrust of political parties. We 
may speak about strong ‘anti-party sentiments’ (Fink-Hafner 1995). This affects 
political participation. Voter turnout is now on average considerably lower than 
in Western Europe, and is even decreasing in some ‘new democracies’. 
DECONSENSUALISATION AND DECONSOLIDATION
The political space in former communist countries is still more fluid compared 
to that of established Western democracies. Moreover, in the last few years we 
can speak about the destabilization of political space and the deconsolidation of 
political parties. This change is related to the relationship between different elite 
factions, prevailing ideological patterns, and changes in the political conduct of 
key players.
160
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY VOL. 8 (2017)3S
MATEVZ TOMŠIČ
The political life of the new democracies is characterized by the rise of person-
based politics. There are a number of features of these countries that create 
fertile conditions for the personalization of political life. The low level of trust 
of citizenry in traditional political agents, especially political parties,3 opens the 
door to a non-party politics which is not based on a coherent ideology, and the 
elaboration of party programs structured around the personal traits of particular 
political actors. In such circumstances, the personal appeal of political leaders 
often comes into play, since it can overcome the weaknesses of their parties. 
Many parties, radical as well as mainstream, have contained (or now contain) 
strong characters such as Fidesz’s Victor Orban in Hungary, or the Kaczynski 
brothers of the Law and Justice party in Poland. Moreover, many politicians 
build their appeal on an anti-party or even anti-political platform (as is the case 
with Victor Uspaskich in Lithuania, Zoran Janković in Slovenia, and Andrej 
Babiš in Czech Republic). These individuals entered the political space from the 
business sphere and during their campaigns severely criticized the established 
political parties, proclaiming that their different, more ‘managerial’ approach 
to governance would wipe away the malfunctions of established politics. This 
approach is typical of many newly-formed political organizations. 
The rise of person-based politics came about in a situation characterized by 
the poor performance of established political parties and their governments. 
The low administrative efficiency of these governments was accompanied 
by their lack of responsibility (Tomšič and Prijon 2013). The bad image of 
political institutions, especially political parties, regardless of their ideological 
orientation, became predominant in the assessments of the population. The 
trend to a decrease in trust of political institutions is evident in many Western 
democracies, but is more profound in the new democracies. Among them, 
political parties are among the most distrusted (Makarovič and Tomšič 2015). 
There are many behaviors of established political actors, such as ideologisation, 
incompetence, clientism, corruption, and other dysfunctional practices, which 
contribute to such negative sentiments. In such a climate, ‘new faces’ are able 
to gain popularity, especially those who build their campaigns on personalized 
and sometimes ‘non-political’ platforms.
High volatility is reflected in the increasing occurrence of highly personalized 
new parties which are successful in one election, but usually become marginalized 
or even disappear from the political scene in a short time, being replaced by 
‘newer’ parties (Haughton and Deegan-Krause 2015). We can witness political 
destabilization even in the countries considered to have rather stable political 
3  According to the Eurobarometer from May 2017, trust in political parties is, in all countries of the 
region – with the exception of Hungary – below the EU average. 
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and party systems – such as the Czech Republic and Slovenia. This is reflected 
in the increasing frequency of pre-elections and changes of government – for 
example, in Slovenia the last two elections took place before the regular term 
of office had expired, and three governments have been exchanged in the last 
five years. 
Political destabilization is coupled with the deconsolidation of party space. 
The latter is related to the above-mentioned weaknesses of political parties in 
these new democracies. We claim that there is no country in East-Central Europe 
with a party system in which a major political role is played by two parties, one 
left and one right of center, that continuously exchange power positions – as is 
usually the case in established Western democracies.  Although the left-right 
divide is rather strong in this region (unlike in most former Soviet republics 
where it is more or less irrelevant), parties at both poles struggle to establish 
firm and long-term political support.4 It seemed that the Czech Republic would 
be an exception to this trend, since during the first two decades after the 
democratic transition the political space was dominated by the center-rightist 
Civic Democratic Party and the center-leftist Czech Social Democratic Party 
(one or the other had led every government coalition since 1992). However, the 
former experienced a significant defeat in the 2013 parliamentary elections, 
their support ranking them in fifth place among political parties, at less than 8% 
(down from more than 20% in the 2010 election), gaining the party only 16 seats 
in parliament (compared to the previous election, it lost 37 seats). With this, the 
Civic Democratic Party lost its primacy on the right of the political space. 
Power-relations within political elites still strongly vary in the region. There 
are countries in which the domination of the rightist faction is evident (meaning 
such governments were in place for most of the transition period), including 
Poland, Hungary, Estonia and Latvia, while the leftist faction prevails in 
Slovenia. In others, the situation in rather unclear either due to the presence 
of mixed government coalitions (e.g. the coalition of social democrats and 
radical nationalists in Slovakia), or due to participation in the former by parties 
whose ideological orientation is unclear (Andrej Babiš’ ANO 2011 in the Czech 
Republic).
In some countries we can witness a shift in power relations over time. For 
example, in Poland and Hungary, the right and left used to periodically take 
power until the previous decade, while later the right become dominant. In 
Poland, the major role is now played by the traditionalist/nationalist Law and 
4  It is not unusual for government parties to experience electoral losses of a magnitude that they are 
eliminated from Parliament. For example, in the 1997 elections in Poland, both members of the 
government coalition remained outside the Sejm (the lower house). 
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Order party and the liberal-conservative Civil Platform, while in Hungary the 
shift went even further to the right, with the nationalist and Euro-sceptic Fidesz 
controlling government and the extreme-rightist Jobbik as its main ‘alternative’.
Ideological polarization within the political elite (and wider) remains one 
of the main features of political life. Conflicts of a symbolic nature (attitudes 
toward communism, nation, religion etc.) are still very prominent and often 
determine political dynamics. Left-right positioning is usually more related to 
cultural/identity issues than to economic ones. However, conflicts of a symbolic 
nature are often conditioned by the interests of their protagonists, and can thus 
serve as a means of (de)legitimizing existing power relations and exercising 
control over material resources (Tomšič 2016). For example, conflicts that result 
from a different understanding and assessment of the communist past and the 
nature of the former regime can largely be understood as the efforts made by 
various factions of the political elite to prove their entitlement to their leading 
positions in society. 
This polarization is connected to the rise of populism, which can be perceived 
as a system of beliefs and guiding principles that glorify the majority of people 
in opposition to one leading minority – depicted in terms of a harmful ‘other’ – 
which the former attempts to deprive of their rights, dignity, voice, sovereignty, 
values, wellbeing, etc. (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008; Mudde 2004). Anti-
elitist and anti-European populism, usually manifested in the form of the above-
mentioned, person-based politics and which can be perceived as the revolt 
of disappointed ‘masses’ against ‘unresponsive’ established elites (both at a 
national and EU level) (Krastev 2007), further undermines the conditions for a 
consensus-based political process. 
There are still elements of consensualism among political elites from the 
region, particularly with regard to the external institutional environment. Based 
on the empirical analysis of INTUNE (2007 and 2009) and ENEC (2014) data,5 
we cannot confirm any significant loosening of the pro-European consensus 
within the political elites in EU countries from CEE.6 Differences with regard 
to attitudes towards the European Union do not match the left-right ideological 
divide, but divide between moderate and extremist parties. The vast majority 
of the moderate left and moderate right see no danger in EU integration (either 
in terms of its impacts on culture or the welfare system). However, growing 
disagreement between EU institutions and governments of ‘Eastern’ EU 
members about issues such as migration, coupled with the poor management of 
5  One should remember that from this group of countries, only Hungary, Lithuania and Slovenia 
(ENEC) were included in the surveys.
6 The exception is Hungary, where the ‘Orbanisation’ of Hungary implies a clear Euro-sceptic turn.
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these issues could lead to the rise of Euroscepticism and thus a deterioration in 
the pro-European consensus.  
DETERIORATION IN THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY
EU accession did not automatically boost democratic development. On the 
contrary, we can observe stagnation or even regression in terms of the quality of 
democracy. It appears that young domestic democratic institutions are not able 
to prevent this trend. In some cases, it seems that the progress that was achieved 
in a quarter of a century of post-socialist development could be lost in a much 
shorter period of time. 
The lack of progress in terms of democratic achievement has been captured 
in comparative surveys such as the Nations in Transit (prepared on a yearly 
basis by Freedom House) which contains an evaluation of the political process 
in former communist countries from Central and Eastern Europe. Considering 
the period from 2004 onwards (when these countries joined the EU), the 
‘democracy score’ improved only in two countries – Latvia and the Czech 
Republic (although since 2008 it has worsened) – while in others, it deteriorated 
in a more or less significant way (see Table 1). The most severe decrease took 
place in Hungary (from 1.96 in 2004 to 3.54 in 2017), followed by Poland and 
Slovakia.7 In the first, we can observe a continuous deterioration in democratic 
conditions as measured by this index. The position of Hungary in the group of 
‘consolidated democracies’ regressed even further, leaving it in the group of 
‘semi-consolidated democracies’.
7  'Democracy score' consists of following elements: electoral process, civil society, independent 
media, national democratic governance, local democratic governance, judicial framework and 
independence, and corruption. (Starting with the 2005 edition, Freedom House introduced separate 
analysis and ratings for national democratic governance and local democratic governance to 
provide readers with more detailed and nuanced analysis of these two important subjects.) The 
assessment figures range from 1 to 7 . Lower figure indicates higher scores for democracy(https://
freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit-methodology).
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Table 1: Democracy score in countries from East-Central Europe (2004-2017)8
Democracy score 
2004 2008 2012 2017
Bulgaria 3.25 2.86 3.14 3.29
Croatia 3.83 3.64 3.61 3.71
Czech Republic 2.33 2.14 2.18 2.25
Estonia 1.92 1.93 1.93 1.93
Hungary 1.96 2.14 2.86 3.54
Latvia 2.17 2.07 2.11 2.04
Lithuania 2.13 2.25 2.29 2.32
Poland 1.75 2.39 2.14 2.57
Romania 3.58 3.36 3.43 3.39
Slovakia 2.08 2.29 2.50 2.61
Slovenia 1.75 1.86 1.89 2.04
Source: Nations in Transit 2004, 2008, 2012, 2017
At least in some cases we can witness the reversion of (semi)authoritarian 
practices such as exertion of control over the media, and the undermining 
of the principles of the rule of law (Bugarič 2015; Bugarič and Kuhelj 2015; 
Lengyel and Ilonszki 2012). The latter is especially one of the most problematic 
points of the post-communist transformation. In some cases, assaults on 
the courts (constitutional courts and other ‘regular’ courts) have already 
transformed once-powerful veto players into ‘toothless’ legal actors (Bugarič 
and Ginsburg 2016). This deterioration in judiciary independence holds 
particularly true of Hungary and Poland. Both countries are facing repeated 
criticism and condemnation, not only from domestic and international civil 
society but also from the European Commission and the European Parliament 
for undermining the autonomy of rule-of–law institutions, as well as other 
societal subsystems.9 There are also other obstacles to the functioning of 
the rule of law that are often not detected by comparative surveys. In some 
countries from East-Central Europe, the judiciary and other elements of 
the state apparatus are still strongly influenced by members of the former 
communist regime whose mentality presents a significant obstacle to the 
performance of these institutions in terms of the protection of human rights 
8 Bulgaria, Romania (2007) and Croatia (2013) joint the EU later. 
9  For example, a legislative change in the field of higher education introduced by Hungarian 
authorities undermined the position of privately funded Central European University (CEU), one of 
the most prestigious institutions in the field of humanities and social sciences in this part of Europe. 
At the time of writing, their academic freedom remained in grave danger.
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and liberties (Tomšič 2017). Furthermore, there is evidence of the severe 
violations of these rights, even at the highest levels of the judicial structure.10 
THE IMPACT OF THE CRISIS
The perception is widespread that the crisis created fertile soil for political 
destabilization. To be sure, first the financial and later the ‘migrant crisis’ and 
the poor performance of European institutions in dealing with these gave strong 
impetus to populist, anti-elitist and establishment political forces. The rise of 
anti-migrant sentiments increased the attractiveness of parties who blamed the 
establishment (particularly European institutions) for problems related to the 
immigration of people from the Middle East and Africa. However, discontent 
with the socio-economic situation in East-Central Europe, and especially with 
the conduct of political elites, begun to grow before the outbreak of the crisis. 
Sometimes this manifested in mass protests, as was the case in Hungary in 2006 
after a recording became public of the incumbent Prime Minister Gyurcsany 
admitting to lying about economic conditions. However, it is not the economic 
situation in terms of how the national economy performed during the crisis 
that is the sole (or not even the major) determinant of citizens’ attitudes toward 
established political elite. An example of this is Poland, which performed 
well during the crisis (the only EU country with positive economic growth 
throughout the crisis period) but the ruling elite in the form of Civil Platform, 
which was obviously efficient in coping with economic challenges, nevertheless, 
lost a significant share of popularity and experienced a severe defeat at the 2015 
parliamentary elections. Similar is the effect of the migrant crisis. The strongest 
anti-migrant sentiments and the firmest rejection of migrant quotas comes from 
countries with a small number of refugees and negligible Muslim populations.  
The impact of the crisis on relations between different elite factions is thus 
indirect at best. The significant ideological polarization that has increased 
in some cases is predominantly determined by ‘internal’ factors. The gap 
between the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of the transition still plays an important role 
in the political dynamics of these countries, as do unfinished issues from the 
10  One of the most obvious examples of such malign practices is the Slovenian ‘Patria case’, where 
the former Prime Minister and the leader of Slovenian Democratic Party (the largest center-
right(ist) party in the country), Janez Janša, was sentenced and imprisoned in 2014 on the basis of 
weakly grounded accusations of ‘reception of the promise of the bribery’ in a public procurement 
tender for armored-cars from the Finnish manufacturer Patria. The sentence was finally annulled 
by the Slovenian Constitutional court.
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recent past. In the context of weak institutional performance (particularly the 
institution of the rule of law), this situation inhibits the potential for political 
cooperation and dialog between different elite factions. 
CONCLUSION
Bearing in mind above-mentioned developments, one may question the real 
strength of the consensus between elite factions in the countries of East-Central 
Europe. As stated by Baylis (2012: 104), “given the inherent ambiguity of the 
concept of ‘elite consensus’, observers would be well-advised to be cautious 
about assigning it too quickly after a major political, social, or economic 
upheaval”. How persistent was elite settlement initially? And how ‘deep’ was the 
mutual agreement between elite factions about the main norms and principles 
of political conduct? The two countries that used to be called out as examples 
of successful elite settlement– Hungary and Poland 11– are now perceived as 
those countries in which the most evident backsliding of democracy is taking 
place (Greskovits 2015). Phenomena that are spreading throughout the region, 
such as persistent and even increasing ideological polarization, treating political 
opponents as ‘enemies’, and the rise of anti-elitist populism, show that the initial 
elite consensus was rather ‘thin’: it referred to the formal aspects of regime 
transition rather than to deeply rooted democratic values. In some cases, as 
in Slovenia, alleged elite consensus (supposedly existing in the 1990s) was 
in fact a quasi-consensus, since what appeared as broad agreement about key 
policy issues and types of socio-economic regulation was the expression of the 
ideological hegemony of one elite faction (Adam and Tomšič 2012). 
Political polarization and the deconsolidation of political space are not 
only ‘Eastern’ phenomena, meaning they are not ‘reserved’ for the ‘new 
democracies’ of Central and Eastern Europe. We are now also witnessing the 
rise of anti-elitist and anti-establishment sentiments and political populism in 
established Western democracies. However, in countries where institutions – 
especially those in charge in the rule of law – are weak, and thus inefficient, 
such tendencies are more detrimental. Even though the restoration of classical 
authoritarianism is unlikely, the situation shows that the sustainable development 
of democracy should not be perceived as self-evident. The same is the case with 
elite consensus. For the latter to persist, institutional conditions that enable 
pluralism, the dispersal of resources, and the balance of power are necessary. 
11 See to this, for example, Higley et al., ed., 1998.
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On this basis, potential competition and cooperation between the various elite 
factions on an equal basis is possible.
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